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PALMER DEPAULIS 
Director of Public Policy & Communications 
Marilyn M. Branch, Clerk 
Utah Court of Appeals 
230 South 500 East, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Re: Pendergrass v. Utah Bd. of Pardons ££ al. . Case No. 940560-CA 
Dear Ms. Branch: 
Pursuant to Rule 24 (j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, respondents hereby submit this letter advising the Court 
of pertinent and significant authority that has come to their 
attention regarding the applicability of Rule 65B(e) to review of 
actions by the Board of Pardons in the above-captioned case. 
On pages 4 and 7 of respondents' principal brief, respondents 
explicitly relied on the Court's decision in Preece v. House. 848 
P.2d 163 (Utah App. 1993), for the proposition that claims of 
procedural due process violations by the Board of Pardons are 
cognizable under subsection (e) of Utah R. Civ. P. 65B, rather than 
under subsection (b) or subsection (c). Respondents acknowledged 
in a footnote (see Brief of Appellees at 7, n.l) that a review of 
Preece was pending before the Supreme Court of Utah, with the 
applicable subsection of Rule 65B at issue. 
On November 23, 1994, the supreme court entered its opinion in 
Preece (see Preece v. House. No. 920605 (Utah November 23, 1994), 
attached). Because the supreme court found that this Court lacked 
appellate jurisdiction in the case, it vacated this Court's Preece 
opinion. However, as this Court had done, the supreme court 
considered Preece's claims under Rule 65B(e) (see slip opinion at 
5). 
A copy of the supreme court's opinion is enclosed for the 
Court's use. 
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Sincerely, 
^OStoO Nancy L. Kemp Assis tant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAIL.IN 
^ |lerej:)y certify that on Lliib iULli dajy of November, 1994, a 
true and accurate copy of the foregoing Rule 24 (j) letter was 
iiiiITpn postage prepaid, to t tie Following: 
John Fletcher Pendergxass 
Central Utah Correctional Facility 
P. 0. Box 550 
Gunnison, Utah 84634 
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This opinion is subject to revision before final 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH A*. 
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Robert D. Preece, No. 920605 
Plaintiff and Petitioner, 
F I L E D 
v. November 23, 1994 
Tom House, Warden of the Utah 
State Prison; Pete Haun, 
Chairman of the Utah Board 
of Pardons; Heather Cooke, 
Member of the Utah Board of 
Pardons, and other individual 
members of the Utah Board of 
Pardons both past and present 
whose identities are presently 
unknown, 
Defendants and Respondents. Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable David S. Young 
Attorneys: Craig S. Cook, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff 
R. Paul Van Dam, Att'y Gen., James H. Beadles, Asst, 
Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for defendants 
J. Thomas Boven, Salt Lake City, for Utah State 
Prison Inmates 
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
HOWE, Justice: 
We granted certiorari to review the decision of the 
court of appeals in Preece v. House, 848 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. App, 
1993), cert, granted. 853 P.2d 89 (Utah 1993). 
In July 1982, Robert D. Preece pleaded guilty to two 
counts of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, and was 
sentenced to two five-to-life terms of imprisonment. 
Approximately one year after his incarceration, he stabbed and 
killed an inmate to whom he owed money. He pleaded guilty to 
manslaughter and was sentenced to an additional term of one to 
fifteen years to run concurrently with his other sentences. 
Eight years later, Preece attended a parole grant 
hearing conducted by Heather Cooke, a member of the Utah Board of 
Pardons. She informed him that under the Utah Sentence and 
Release Guidelines, Utah Court Rules Ann. app. D (1994), he 
should be incarcerated for "147 months, which would mean no 
release until October 1994." However, she indicated that she 
planned to "go below [the] guideline" and recommend to the board 
that he be released on May 11, 1993. Four days later, the full 
board rejected Cooke's recommendation and ordered that Preece not 
be paroled until October 11, 1994, the parole date which the 
board thought was consistent with the guidelines. 
In May 1992, Preece filed this petition for 
extraordinary relief in third district court under rule 65B of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. It listed as defendants Tom 
House, Warden of the Utah State Prison, Pete Haun, Chairman of 
the Utah Board of Pardons, Heather Cooke, and other "[individual 
members of the Utah State Board of Pardons both past and present 
whose identities are presently unknown." He alleged that 
(1) Cooke was not impartial, (2) the board had considered a 
disciplinary report that was supposed to have been expunged from 
his prison file, (3) the board violated his procedural and 
substantive due process rights by not allowing him to "know what 
information was being submitted or relied upon" during his parole 
hearings, (4) the Utah sentencing guidelines create an 
"expectation of release" or liberty interest entitled to due 
process protection, and (5) due process requires the board to 
give an explanation for its decision to depart from the 
sentencing guidelines. 
Sometime during the summer of 1992, Assistant Attorney 
General Steven Morrisett discovered that the board of pardons' 
staff had in fact miscalculated the length of Preece's 
incarceration under the guidelines at 147 months (12 1/2 years). 
The correct time period was 111 months (9 1/2 years). Morrisett 
disclosed this error to the district court and indicated that the 
board was likely to grant Preece a rehearing. On the basis of 
this information, the court continued the case to "let the Board 
of Pardons decide what they want to do in terms of taking their 
own action first." 
In September 1992, Preece appeared before Don 
Blanchard, a member of the board of pardons, for a special 
attention hearing. Blanchard took the case under advisement for 
approximately 2 weeks, after which the full board rendered its 
decision to retain the October 1994 parole date. Preece amended 
his complaint, arguing that his original allegations against the 
board applied to the special attention hearing. 
The district court granted the writ of habeas corpus 
and ordered that Preece be "released from the Utah State Prison 
forthwith." The court stated: 
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[U]nder the circumstance of the error made as 
to the guidelines discussed with Petitioner 
• . • the Petitioner is entitled to an 
explanation of the error which the Board 
refuses to do. Further# due process requires 
fair process and a Petitioner is entitled to 
an explanation of why the error should be 
ignored and the longer term served. It is 
cruel and unusual punishment to do otherwise. 
The Petitioner has been denied due process 
and is being treated to cruel and unusual 
punishment when no correction or explanation 
is given as to the mistake and as to the time 
to be served by the Petitioner. 
The court of appeals granted defendants' ex parte motion for stay 
pending appeal. 
After hearing argument, the court of appeals rendered a 
per curiam decision. Preece v. House. 848 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993). It reversed the district court's order of release, 
holding that "the authority to determine parole dates is vested 
in the Board of Pardons11 and that habeas review of parole 
decisions is "limited to a review of procedural due process and 
does not extend authority for judicial review of the 
%reasonableness of the parole decision.'" Id. at 164. The court 
further held that the board had violated its own rules by not 
providing a written explanation for its decision to retain the 
October 1994 date. Utah Admin. R. 671-305-2 (1992). However, it 
ruled that the "appropriate remedy" for this violation was "to 
require the Board expeditiously to provide the district court and 
petitioner with a written explanation of its reasons for the 
parole decision." Preece, 848 P.2d at 164. Finally, the court 
remanded the case, ordering the district court to treat it under 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65B(e). Id. 
We granted Preece's petition for a writ of certiorari. 
Preece v. House, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993). A few days later, 
defendants filed a motion to vacate the opinion of the court of 
appeals and to consider the case as an original direct appeal 
from the district court transferred here pursuant to rule 44 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. After hearing argument, 
we denied the motion but directed that the question of 
jurisdiction be briefed and argued in this appeal. 
We first address the jurisdictional issue. Prior to 
April 1992, appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary 
writ sought by persons who were incarcerated or serving any other 
criminal sentence were governed by Utah Code Ann. 
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§ 78-2a-3(2) (g) .* That subsection provided that such appeals 
should be taken to the court of appeals except when the petition 
challenged the conviction of or the sentence for a first degree 
or capital felony, in which case the appeal would be heard by 
this court pursuant to section 78-2-2(3)(j). Accordingly, we 
held in Padilla v. Utah Board of Pardons. 820 P.2d 473, 473 (Utah 
1991), that a petitioner who had been convicted of a first degree 
felony and who alleged that the board of pardons had violated his 
rights to due process but who did not challenge his conviction or 
sentence must appeal the denial of his petition to the court of 
appeals rather than to this court* 
However, in April 1992, section 78-2a-3 was amended by 
the addition of subsection 2(h) to specifically deal with appeals 
from orders on petitions for extraordinary writ challenging 
decisions of the board of pardons* That subsection provides: 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate 
jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(h) appeals from the orders on 
petitions for extraordinary writs 
challenging the decisions of the Board 
of Pardons, except in cases involving a 
first degree or capital felony. 
Thus, under subsection 2(h) such appeals shall be heard by the 
court of appeals ••except in cases involving a first degree or 
capital felony,* in which case, again, the appeal would be heard 
by this court pursuant to section 78-2-2(3)(j). 
We believe that subsection 2(h) must be interpreted in 
light of subsection 2(g) and that it is the intent of 2(h) that 
the court of appeals hear appeals from orders on petitions for 
extraordinary writ challenging decisions of the board of pardons 
That subsection provides: 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate 
jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
• * • 9 
(g) appeals from orders on 
petitions for extraordinary writs sought 
by persons who are incarcerated or 
serving any other criminal sentence, 
except petitions constituting a 
challenge to a conviction of or the 
sentence for a first degree or capital 
felony. 
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except when the petition additionally challenges the conviction 
of. or sentence for a first degree felony or a capital felony* in 
that instance, the appeal is to be heard by this court. 
In the instant case, Preece, in his petition, 
challenged a decision of the board of pardons made at his 
original parole grant hearing that fixed the length of his prison 
stay. We held in Labrum v. Utah State Board of Pardons. 870 P.2d 
902, 911-12 (Utah 1993), that the determination made by the board 
of pardons at an original parole grant hearing as to the time to 
be served by a prison inmate is inherently a sentencing function, 
gee algQ Foote v. Utah Bd. of Pardons. 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991) 
(board of pardons performs function analogous to that of trial 
judge in jurisdictions .that have determinate sentencing scheme) 
Thus, Preece, on this appeal, is challenging a decision of the 
board of pardons and his sentence for two first degree felonies. 
Accordingly, his appeal lies with this court, not with the court 
of appeals. We therefore vacate the opinion of the court of 
appeals and consider this case as an original direct appeal from 
the district court transferred here from the court of appeals 
pursuant to rule 44 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Having determined the grounds upon which this court has 
jurisdiction, .we now turn to the merits of the petition. The 
district court ordered Preece ••released from the Utah State 
Prison forthwith" on the ground that the board refused to correct 
or explain its decision to retain a release date which had been 
miscalculated under the Utah sentencing guidelines. Preece 
contends that the sentencing guidelines create a liberty interest 
or an "expectation of release" subject to protection under the 
state due process clause. Utah Const, art. I, § 7. He argues 
that the board must "give specific and detailed reasoning" 
justifying a decision to impose a release date that is 
inconsistent with the guidelines. 
The state sentencing guidelines used by the board of 
pardons do not have the force and effect of law. Labrum. 870 
P.2d at 908. Consequently, any "expectation of release" derived 
from the guidelines is at best tenuous. However, we need not 
decide whether the state due process clause requires the board to 
explain decisions which do not conform to the guidelines. The 
board's own rules require that an "explanation of the reasons for 
[a] decision [be] given and supported in writing." Utah Admin. 
R. 71-305-2 (1992). When the board failed to comply with this 
rule, Preece appropriately sought extraordinary relief. Utah R. 
Civ. P. 65B(e)(2)(B) (person can petition court for extraordinary 
relief "where an inferior court, administrative agency, 
corporation or person has failed to perform an act required by 
law as a duty of office, trust or station"). 
However, the district court exceeded its authority when 
it ordered Preece "released . . . forthwith." In our 
indeterminate sentencing scheme, the board of pardons acts as a 
5 Nr>. Q?Ofi05 
sentencing entity# having exclusive authority to ••determine [ ] the 
actual number of years a defendant is to serve." Labruro, 870 
P.2d at 907 (citing Foote. 808 P.2d at 735). Moreover, not every 
circumstance that gives rise to extraordinary relief compels the 
immediate release of a petitioner from every aspect of physical 
imprisonment. See Wickham v. Fisherr 629 P.2d 896# 900 (Utah 
1981) (holding that remedy for unlawful condition of confinement 
is "%elimination of. that specific condition of physical 
imprisonment,'" not "%release from every aspect of physical 
imprisonment'" (quoting Cravatt v. Thomas. 399 F. Supp. 956, 962-
63 (W.D. Wis. 1975))); accord Termunde v. Cooke, 786 P.2d 1341f 
1342 (Utah 1990). 
Thus, the appropriate remedy in this case was to order 
the board to comply with its rules by giving Preece a written 
explanation for its decision to retain the October 1994 parole 
date. However, this relief "%can no longer affect the rights of 
the litigants'" because the board gave Preece a written 
explanation for its decision during the pendency of this appeal. 
State v. Davis. 721 P.2d 894# 895 (Utah 1986) (quoting Spain v. 
Stewart. 639 P.2d 166f 168 (Utah 1981)). Therefore, this aspect 
of the petition is moot. 
Preece also argues that the board of pardons 
arbitrarily and capriciously chose to exceed his guideline term 
by 36 months. He contends that article I, section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution requires judicial review of this decision. We 
disagree. Utah Code Ann. S 77-27-5(3) (Supp. 1994) provides, 
"Decisions of the Board of Pardons in cases involving paroles, 
pardons, commutations or terminations of sentence, restitution, 
or remission of fines or forfeitures are final and are not 
subject to judicial review." This statute does not preclude 
judicial review of such decisions by way of extraordinary writ. 
Foote. 808 P.2d at 735. However, our review is limited to the 
"process by which~th"e Board undertakes its sentencing function." 
Lancaster v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 869 P.2d 945, 947 (Utah 1994). 
"[W]e do not sit as a panel of review on the result, absent some 
other constitutional claim." Id. Furthermore, so long as the 
period of incarceration decided upon by the board of pardons 
falls within an inmate's applicable indeterminate range, e.g., 
five years to life, then that decision, absent unusual 
circumstances, cannot be arbitrary and capricious. 
Finally, as explained above, Preece contends that the 
board violated his procedural and substantive due process rights 
by not allowing him to "know what information was being submitted 
or relied upon" during his parole hearings. In LabrumP 870 P.2d 
at 909, we determined that state due process "requires that the 
inmate know what information the Board will be considering at the 
[original parole grant] hearing and that the inmate know soon 
enough in advance to have a reasonable opportunity to prepare 
responses and rebuttal of inaccuracies." See Utah Const, art. I, 
S 7. We further held that this rule applied "to any inmate who 
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currently ha[d] A claim pending in the district court or on 
appeal before th*s court or the court of appeals challenging 
original parole fifrant hearing procedures on due process grounds.n 
Labrum. 870 P. 2d at 914 • In oral argument, defendants conceded 
that the board violated Preece's due process rights as defined in 
Labrum and that £is petition for extraordinary relief on this 
ground was pending at the time Labrum was decided. Therefore, 
Preece is entitled to a new hearinq before the board. 
The unconditional order of release entered by the 
district court i£ reversed. The case is remanded to the district 
court for disposition consistent this opinion. 
WE CONCUR: 
Michael D. Zimmerman, Chief 
Justice 
I. Daniel Stewart, Associate 
Chief Justice 
Christine M. Durham, Justice 
Leonard H. Russon, Justice 
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